數村 友也

Last Update: 2021/06/02 12:56:54

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Name(Kanji/Kana/Abecedarium Latinum)
數村 友也/カズムラ トモヤ/Kazumura, Tomoya
Primary Affiliation(Org1/Job title)
Graduate School of Economics/Senior Lecturer/ Junior Associate Professor
Faculty
Org1 Job title
経済学部
Academic Degree
Field(Japanese) Field(English) University(Japanese) University(English) Method
博士(経済学) 大阪大学
修士(経済学) 大阪大学
researchmap URL
https://researchmap.jp/kazumura
Published Papers
Author Author(Japanese) Author(English) Title Title(Japanese) Title(English) Bibliography Bibliography(Japanese) Bibliography(English) Publication date Refereed paper Language Publishing type Disclose
Kazumura, Tomoya, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa Kazumura, Tomoya, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa Kazumura, Tomoya, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasiliner preferences Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasiliner preferences Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasiliner preferences Journal of Economic Theory, accepted Journal of Economic Theory, accepted Journal of Economic Theory, accepted 2020/03 Refereed English Research paper(scientific journal) Disclose to all
Kazumura, Tomoya, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa Kazumura, Tomoya, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa Kazumura, Tomoya, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa Mechanism design without quasilinearity Mechanism design without quasilinearity Mechanism design without quasilinearity Theoretical Economics, forthcoming Theoretical Economics, forthcoming Theoretical Economics, forthcoming 2019/09 Refereed English Research paper(scientific journal) Disclose to all
Tajika, Tomoya, Tomoya Kazumura Tajika, Tomoya, Tomoya Kazumura Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects International Journal of Game Theory, 48, 2, 543-569 International Journal of Game Theory, 48, 2, 543-569 International Journal of Game Theory, 48, 2, 543-569 2019/06 Refereed English Research paper(scientific journal) Disclose to all
Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 47, 3, 633-663 SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 47, 3, 633-663 SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 47, 3, 633-663 2016/10 English Research paper(scientific journal) Disclose to all
Title language:
Teaching subject(s)
Name(Japanese) Name(English) Term Department Period
メカニズムデザイン Mechanism design 後期 経済学研究科 2021/04-2022/03
外国文献研究(経・英)A-E1 Readings in Humanities and Social Sciences (Economics, English)A-E1 前期 全学共通科目 2021/04-2022/03
外国文献研究(経・英)B-E1 Readings in Humanities and Social Sciences (Economics, English)B-E1 後期 全学共通科目 2021/04-2022/03