NEWTON JonathanCharlesScott

Last Update: 2019/05/17 16:02:09

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Name(Kanji/Kana/Abecedarium Latinum)
NEWTON Jonathan Charles Scott/ニユートン ジヨナサン チヤールズ スコツト/Newton, Jonathan
Primary Affiliation(Org1/Job title)
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research (KIER)/Associate Professor
Affiliated programs (koza)
Org1 Job title
Graduate Schools Economics Associate Professor
Academic Degree
Field(Japanese) Field(English) University(Japanese) University(English) Method
修士(Economics) Birkbeck College
博士(Economics) University of Cambridge
Personal Website(s) (URL(s))
URL
http://jonathannewton.net
http://sharedintentions.net
ORCID ID
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3290-9721
researchmap URL
https://researchmap.jp/7000023145
Research Topics
(English)
Evolutionary game theory, collaboration.
Overview of the research
(English)
I specialize in studying evolutionary game theory, particulary in relation to the convergence of societies to conventions and traditions. My work overlaps economics, mathematics, evolutionary anthropology and philosophy. A particular focus of my research is on collaboration. How did collaboration, as in joint decision making, evolve and where can we expect to find it? What effect does collaboration have on the conventions and norms that are established in society?
Fields of research (key words)
Key words(Japanese) Key words(English)
Evolution
Collaboration
Game theory
Collective agency
Conventions
Published Papers
Author Author(Japanese) Author(English) Title Title(Japanese) Title(English) Bibliography Bibliography(Japanese) Bibliography(English) Publication date Refereed paper Language Publishing type Disclose
Heinrich H. Nax, Jonathan Newton Heinrich H. Nax, Jonathan Newton Heinrich H. Nax, Jonathan Newton Risk Attitudes and Risk Dominance in the Long Run Risk Attitudes and Risk Dominance in the Long Run Risk Attitudes and Risk Dominance in the Long Run Games and Economic Behavior Games and Economic Behavior Games and Economic Behavior 2019/05 Refereed Disclose to all
Jonathan Newton Jonathan Newton Jonathan Newton Agency Equilibrium Agency Equilibrium Agency Equilibrium Games, 10, 1, 14 Games, 10, 1, 14 Games, 10, 1, 14 2019/03 Refereed Disclose to all
Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary, Jonathan Newton Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary, Jonathan Newton Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary, Jonathan Newton Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry Games and Economic Behavior, 110, 273 Games and Economic Behavior, 110, 273 Games and Economic Behavior, 110, 273 2018/07 Refereed Disclose to all
Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance Games Games Games 2018/05 Refereed Disclose to all
Philip R. Neary, , Jonathan Newton Philip R. Neary, , Jonathan Newton Philip R. Neary, , Jonathan Newton Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2, 1, 141 Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2, 1, 141 Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2, 1, 141 2017/12 Refereed Disclose to all
Hwang S.-H, Newton J. Hwang S.-H, Newton J. Hwang S.-H, Newton J. Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games Economic Theory, 64, 3, 589-604 Economic Theory, 64, 3, 589-604 Economic Theory, 64, 3, 589-604 2017 Refereed Disclose to all
Newton J. Newton J. Newton J. Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 517-534 Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 517-534 Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 517-534 2017 Refereed Disclose to all
Newton J. Newton J. Newton J. The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity International Journal of Game Theory, 46, 2, 583-589 International Journal of Game Theory, 46, 2, 583-589 International Journal of Game Theory, 46, 2, 583-589 2017 Refereed Disclose to all
Klaus B, Newton J. Klaus B, Newton J. Klaus B, Newton J. Stochastic stability in assignment problems Stochastic stability in assignment problems Stochastic stability in assignment problems Journal of Mathematical Economics, 62, 62-74 Journal of Mathematical Economics, 62, 62-74 Journal of Mathematical Economics, 62, 62-74 2016 Refereed Disclose to all
Newton J, Sawa R. Newton J, Sawa R. Newton J, Sawa R. A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 1-27 Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 1-27 Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 1-27 2015 Refereed Disclose to all
Newton J, Angus S.D. Newton J, Angus S.D. Newton J, Angus S.D. Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 172-187 Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 172-187 Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 172-187 2015 Refereed Disclose to all
Angus S.D, Newton J. Angus S.D, Newton J. Angus S.D, Newton J. Emergence of Shared Intentionality Is Coupled to the Advance of Cumulative Culture Emergence of Shared Intentionality Is Coupled to the Advance of Cumulative Culture Emergence of Shared Intentionality Is Coupled to the Advance of Cumulative Culture PLoS Computational Biology, 11, 10 PLoS Computational Biology, 11, 10 PLoS Computational Biology, 11, 10 2015 Refereed Disclose to all
Harris D, Herrmann B, Kontoleon A, Newton J. Harris D, Herrmann B, Kontoleon A, Newton J. Harris D, Herrmann B, Kontoleon A, Newton J. Is it a norm to favour your own group? Is it a norm to favour your own group? Is it a norm to favour your own group? Experimental Economics, 18, 3, 491-521 Experimental Economics, 18, 3, 491-521 Experimental Economics, 18, 3, 491-521 2015 Refereed Disclose to all
Newton J. Newton J. Newton J. Stochastic stability on general state spaces Stochastic stability on general state spaces Stochastic stability on general state spaces Journal of Mathematical Economics, 58, 46-60 Journal of Mathematical Economics, 58, 46-60 Journal of Mathematical Economics, 58, 46-60 2015 Refereed Disclose to all
Newton J. Newton J. Newton J. Cheap talk and editorial control Cheap talk and editorial control Cheap talk and editorial control B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 14, 1, 1-25 B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 14, 1, 1-25 B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 14, 1, 1-25 2014 Refereed Disclose to all
Newton J. Newton J. Newton J. Coalitional stochastic stability Coalitional stochastic stability Coalitional stochastic stability Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 2, 842-854 Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 2, 842-854 Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 2, 842-854 2012 Refereed Disclose to all
Newton J. Newton J. Newton J. Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 1, 364-381 Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 1, 364-381 Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 1, 364-381 2012 Refereed Disclose to all

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Conference Activities & Talks
Title Title(Japanese) Title(English) Conference Conference(Japanese) Conference(English) Promotor Promotor(Japanese) Promotor(English) Date Language Assortment Disclose
Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules[Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] AEI5 Conference AEI5 Conference AEI5 Conference 2019/04/30 English Oral presentation(invited, special) Disclose to all
Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules[Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] Technion University Technion University Technion University 2019/03/18 English Oral presentation(invited, special) Disclose to all
Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules[Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] University of Toulouse University of Toulouse University of Toulouse 2019/03/13 English Oral presentation(invited, special) Disclose to all
Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules[Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] University of Grenoble University of Grenoble University of Grenoble 2019/02/28 English Oral presentation(invited, special) Disclose to all
Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules[Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] University of Florence University of Florence University of Florence 2018/11/12 English Oral presentation(invited, special) Disclose to all
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance[Invited] Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance [Invited] Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance [Invited] IMT Lucca IMT Lucca IMT Lucca 2018/11/12 English Oral presentation(invited, special) Disclose to all
Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules[Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] Conventions under heterogeneous choice rules [Invited] University of Sydney University of Sydney University of Sydney 2018/08/02 English Oral presentation(invited, special) Disclose to all
Title language:
External funds: competitive funds and Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Kakenhi)
Type Position Title(Japanese) Title(English) Period
研究活動スタート支援 Representative The Evolution of Choice Rules (平成30年度分) 2018/04/01-2019/03/31
Teaching subject(s)
Name(Japanese) Name(English) Term Department Period
Economy and Society I-E2 Economy and Society I-E2 前期 全学共通科目 2018/04-2019/03
Economy and Society II-E2 Economy and Society II-E2 後期 全学共通科目 2018/04-2019/03
Introduction to Economics-E2 Introduction to Economics-E2 前期 全学共通科目 2018/04-2019/03
Principles of Economics-E2 Principles of Economics-E2 後期 全学共通科目 2018/04-2019/03
Economy and Society I-E2 Economy and Society I-E2 前期 全学共通科目 2019/04-2020/03
Economy and Society II-E2 Economy and Society II-E2 前期 全学共通科目 2019/04-2020/03
Introduction to Economics-E2 Introduction to Economics-E2 前期 全学共通科目 2019/04-2020/03
Principles of Economics-E2 Principles of Economics-E2 前期 全学共通科目 2019/04-2020/03